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marily examined whether or not the use of social media endangers or strengthens armed forces’ strategic narrative. We 
examine armed forces’ perceptions of risks and opportunities on a broad basis, with a particular focus on areas of de-
ployment. The article is based on a survey of perceptions of social media amongst the armed forces of EU member 
states, thus adding to previous research through its comparative perspective. Whereas previous research has mainly 
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including several smaller nations. In analyzing the results we asked whether or not risk and opportunity perceptions 
were related to national ICT maturity and the existence of a social media strategy. The analysis shows that perceptions 
of opportunities outweigh perceptions of risks, with marketing and two-way communication as the two most promi-
nent opportunities offered by the use of social media. Also, armed forces in countries with a moderate to high ICT ma-
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1. Introduction 
This study surveys and analyzes diverging views 
amongst EU armed forces on the risks and opportunities 
of social media use in areas of deployment. Social media 
pose significant challenges and call for the management 
of issues such as transparency of information and com-
munication with local populations. The use of social me-
dia also raises concerns about the security of deployed 
troops. Social media have been in use in armed forces 
since the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (Nissen, 2015, p. 8). The 
increasing use and importance of social media, alongside 
intensifying debate about the reliance on communica-
tion for successful multinational military interventions, 
give us cause to explore the views of EU armed forces on 
the use of social media. These forces participate togeth-
er on multinational operations, and their views on the 
management of the information flows of social media 
pose increasing problems for coordination and collabo-
ration, and for facilitating and improving their efficiency. 
Social media can be used for multiple purposes. On 
the one hand, social media use might mirror traditional 
ways of thinking about communication as one-way 
communication originating from Shannon and Weav-
er’s transmission model for telecommunication sys-
tems (Shannon, 1948). On the other hand, the use of 
social media could correspond with more recent views 
on two-way communication, influenced by digital 
technology (e.g. Dunleavy, Margett, Bastows, & Tinkler, 
2006). A study of the Swedish Armed Forces indicates 
that market logic is the key driving force for communi-
cation via social media; the Armed Forces are seen as 
an agency in various markets competing with other ac-
tors for personnel, influence, funding and political at-
tention (Deverell, Olsson, Wagnsson, Johnsson, & 
Hellman, 2015). The use of social media, primarily for 
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marketing purposes, corresponds with a general trend 
within public organizations towards more market driv-
en communication (e.g. Byrkjeflot & Angell, 2007). 
If armed forces place great value on the marketing 
potential of social media, they can choose to ‘let go’ of 
control. However, armed forces may seek to retain 
control of information to ensure its accuracy, and in 
order to prevent the spread of sensitive information 
that may jeopardize personal and operational security. 
Social media can indeed be a disruptive force for na-
tional narratives and government messages in the se-
curity sphere (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2009; Kahn & Kel-
ler, 2004). Therefore, armed forces may instead opt to 
strengthen control and/or censor opposing narratives 
on social media platforms (Cammaerts, 2008; Morozov, 
2011). Research indicates that social media have be-
come more regulated and less free as armed forces 
have grown increasingly aware of the risks involved 
(Bennett, 2013, p. 49; Bjerg Jensen, 2011, p. 196; 
Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2009; Lawson, 2014; Maltby, 
Thornham, & Bennett, 2015). 
However, scholars have paid little attention to how 
armed forces beyond the US and the UK have dealt 
with the ‘social media challenge’ (see for example Bjerg 
Jensen, 2011; Maltby et al., 2015; and Jones & Baines, 
2013, on the UK; and Rid & Hecker, 2009, on the US, 
Great Britain and Israel). Previous research has mainly 
focused on whether or not armed forces have been 
harmed by or have managed to exploit social media, 
whether they have tried to control social media and to 
what degree they have allowed personnel to com-
municate freely via social media. 
Social media provide armed forces with new oppor-
tunities to get their message out in areas of deploy-
ment. For instance, they might see great opportunities 
for marketing their operations via social media without 
having to involve news media. What is clear is that 
armed forces see an increasing need to communicate 
with a multitude of audiences through social media. 
Thus, military organizations disseminate official messag-
es in a transformed media environment, engaging in so-
cial media through channels such as YouTube, blogs, 
Twitter and Facebook (Bennett, 2013, p. 49). In their 
study Caldwell, Murphy and Menning (2009), for exam-
ple, examine the use of social media by the Israeli Army 
and Hezbollah during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. 
They argue that Hezbollah, as a result of skillful social 
media use, was successful, whilst Israel was perceived as 
having failed. ‘…Hezbollah information efforts focused 
directly on gaining trust and sympathy for its cause at all 
levels. Israel provided no countervailing view, allowing 
Hezbollah to drive perceptions that could become uni-
versally accepted as truth’ (Caldwell et al., 2009, p. 6). 
Building upon previous research, this article fills a 
gap in the literature by taking a broader perspective 
and examining European armed forces’ perceptions of 
social media use in areas of deployment. Moreover, we 
examine whether or not armed forces’ perceptions of 
social media are connected to national ICT maturity 
and the existence of a social media strategy (see be-
low). What this study particularly adds to previous re-
search is its comparative perspective; it stands out 
from other studies by including views amongst the 
armed forces of almost all EU states, including all the 
smaller member states. 
2. Previous Research 
Participation in international missions in complex polit-
ical, military and social environments, along with tech-
nological developments, have required armed forces 
across the Western world to develop new expertise in 
a range of areas, including communications (Forster, 
2006, p. 6). The involvement of international organiza-
tions (NATO, UN) in a number of complex emergencies 
in recent years—e.g. Afghanistan, Libya and Mali—has 
required the ability to communicate across military and 
civilian boundaries, as well as with the populations in 
the countries in question. Participation in international 
missions also requires communication with a nation’s 
own citizens in order to muster popular support for 
perilous military interventions. Despite all this, there is 
limited research examining armed forces from a com-
munication perspective. The research that does exist 
has concentrated mainly on aspects related to strategic 
communication, such as governments’ transmission of 
strategic narratives (Bjerg Jensen, 2014; Jankowski, 
2013; Ringsmose & Börgesen, 2011). The academic de-
bate has focused on social media both as a threat, and 
as an opportunity for armed forces to get their mes-
sage across. For example, in a study of the use of social 
media by the Swedish Armed Forces, Deverell et al. 
(2015) argue for the advantages of social media use 
falling into three broad areas: one-way, two-way and 
market oriented communication. 
Academics who understand social media primarily 
as an opportunity tend to emphasize the inherent po-
tential of social media for disseminating the national 
strategic narrative in situations where armed forces 
have devoted substantial resources to developing their 
own media outlets (Bennett, 2013, p. 49; Karatzogi-
anni, 2008, p. 2). This is so because success in the ap-
plication of force depends ultimately on how the war, 
its purpose and its conduct are perceived at home and 
within the theatre of operations. The use of social me-
dia platforms by armed forces can impact positively on 
both recruitment and the legitimization of the tasks of 
armed forces. Wall (2006, p. 122) suggests that bloggers 
active during Gulf War II did not present alternative per-
spectives of the war, but offered more personal versions 
of prevailing public debate about the war. Personalized 
accounts by military personnel, encouraged to blog di-
rectly ‘from the field’, can be utilized to strengthen a na-
tional strategic narrative (Hellman & Wagnsson, 2015). 
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On the other hand, armed forces face several risks 
by using social media. Firstly, they risk losing control of 
their own narrative from a strategic management per-
spective (e.g. Jones & Baines, 2013). From this perspec-
tive one threat arises from the use of social media by 
military personnel. Having investigated homemade 
videos uploaded to YouTube by coalition soldiers in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Andén-Papadopoulos (2009, p. 
17) suggests ‘The soldiers’ firsthand accounts of the 
war have introduced new and sometimes highly con-
troversial perspectives into the documentation of war-
fare that military and media elites are struggling to 
contain’. In addition to harming the national strategic 
narrative, military personnel using social media in op-
erational theatres can place their comrades or mission 
aims at risk. Academics in the field have, for example, 
stressed how increasing globalization, fueled by new in-
formation technology, has blurred the boundaries be-
tween combatants and non-combatants and between 
home and abroad (Betz, 2008). In such an environment 
it is important to understand that messages intended for 
domestic audiences may easily spread to the area of de-
ployment and, similarly, locally targeted messages may 
be transmitted around the globe (Paul, 2012). 
Besides the problems associated with communica-
tion by individual military personnel, another problem 
in trying to control the strategic narrative is the coordi-
nation of messages. For example, during the Afghani-
stan mission it was not until 2006 that the realization 
dawned ‘that the communication strategy had to be 
aimed at all the relevant target groups—and that these 
were implicated with each other’ (Dimitriu, 2012, p. 
206). The problems associated with targeting several 
audiences at once were also illustrated during NATO’s 
intervention in Libya in 2011, when British messages 
were primarily designed to legitimize the operation in 
the eyes of the domestic audience. As a result, there 
was a lack of consistent messages suitable for the 
needs of local civilians. Instead, messages formulated 
in NATO countries participating in the intervention un-
intentionally reached local audiences and became 
more of a hindrance than a help in building legitimacy 
for the operation (Bjerg Jensen, 2014, pp. 182-183). 
There are also cultural and technical obstacles fac-
ing the use of social media by armed forces in areas of 
deployment. Despite the ambition to reach all the vital 
stakeholders with their communication, from global 
opinion to the local level on the ground, ISAF generally 
had a poor understanding of the Afghan population, 
due to difficulties in understanding local language, cul-
ture and history (COMISAF Initial Assessment, 2009). 
Beyond the problems associated with the cultural gap, 
there are also technical obstacles to communicating 
with the local population through social media due to 
low levels of Internet penetration (International Tele-
communication Union, 2015). Due to low levels of Inter-
net use, key leader engagement and radio became the 
most important sources of information. All the problems 
discussed above risk either distorting the strategic narra-
tive, or impeding it from reaching its target group. 
In the next sections we describe two explanatory 
factors, which we suggest may impact on armed forces’ 
perceptions of social media: the existence of social 
media strategies and ICT maturity in a national setting. 
2.1. The Existence of Social Media Strategies 
Our first explanatory factor relates to the presence or 
otherwise of a social media strategy. As previously dis-
cussed, one important aspect of the military use of so-
cial media is the notion of control, which is often mani-
fested in regulations and policies. Previous research 
indicates that the US armed forces’ attitude to the use 
of social media has changed since the beginning of the 
century. Having been relatively liberal, views have be-
come more restrictive following incidents that could 
have had a negative impact on US public opinion (Law-
son, 2014). Until 2010, social media rules and regula-
tions were rather unclear and based on the need to ask 
superiors’ permission before publishing information that 
could potentially endanger operations (Resteigne, 2010, 
p. 523). The trend in trying to increase control may be 
reinforced by the internal organizational logic likely to 
come into play when communication departments are 
given more resources. There is a general trend within 
public agencies towards professionalization and expan-
sion of communication functions (Byrkjeflot & Angell, 
2007; Deverell et al., 2015; Wæraas, 2010). To sum up, 
public agencies, including armed forces, might conse-
quently be inclined and/or expected to issue official pol-
icies and regulatory documents intended to increase 
control, and restrict the free use of social media. On the 
other hand, they may try to formulate social media poli-
cy so as to encourage and facilitate the use of social 
media for marketing the armed forces, thus loosening 
control, as previously argued. We investigate how the 
adoption of a social media strategy relates to nega-
tive/positive attitudes to the use of social media. 
2.2. ICT Maturity in National Settings 
Our second explanatory factor is the ICT maturity in 
armed forces’ respective home countries. To our 
knowledge there is no previous research connecting an 
armed forces domestic level of ICT to perceptions of 
social media as a threat or opportunity in international 
missions. However, previous research demonstrates 
how the level of ICT maturity in various societies im-
pacts on the use of social media. For example, based 
on a literature review of social media use in e-
government, Magro (2012) concludes that the digital 
divide is a major barrier to e-participation. A study by 
Bertot, Jaeger and  Grimes (2010) shows that the level 
of ICT use in governmental agencies depends, not pri-
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marily on their own preferences regarding new infor-
mation technology, but rather on citizens’ preferences, 
and technical abilities, when interacting with govern-
mental agencies. At the same time, and to their surprise, 
Bonsón, Torres, Royo and Flores (2012) found in their 
study of social media use amongst EU local governments 
that the national level of Internet access, and use by citi-
zens, were not significant predictors of the level of the 
use of Web 2.0 and social media in local government. 
Again, there are arguments for both positions. We 
can expect armed forces from countries with a social 
media savvy population (e.g. Sweden, Finland or Den-
mark) to have a more positive outlook on social media 
use in deployment areas. At the same time, despite the 
use of social media in humanitarian interventions and 
peacekeeping operations ranging from Kosovo to Af-
ghanistan and Darfur, the chiefs of staff should still pay 
attention to the risks involved. 
3. Method 
The questionnaire that forms the basis of the empirical 
analysis was designed to capture views on social media 
use with a focus on risks and opportunities. All the 
armed forces of EU member states responded to the 
questionnaire, with the exception of Greece and Cyprus. 
Luxembourg was included in the study, but claimed not 
to use social media and responded to no more than a 
few questions in the questionnaire, which is probably 
due to the small size of the armed forces of this country. 
We focused on views about social media at the 
highest, strategic, level of organization. When contact-
ing the armed forces of individual countries, we asked 
them for contact with the Head of the Information De-
partment, or another authoritative person who could 
express their official view of the use of social media 
within the Armed Forces. Half of the respondents are 
representatives of armed forces’ information depart-
ments, one third are representatives of the Ministry of 
Defense and the remaining 18 per cent hold other posi-
tions, with tasks related to their armed forces' infor-
mation and communication. 
Policies issued at the strategic level are not always 
followed at lower levels of the organization or by indi-
vidual services (army, navy, air force). Rid and Hecker 
(2009, p. 94) identify an “institutional gap” in Great 
Britain between the public affairs’ leadership at the 
Ministry of Defense and the military command. They 
argue that the public affairs civilian leaders attempted 
to increase control in ways that were not conducive to 
practices at subordinate military levels. The authors 
(2009, p. 223) recommend that military public affairs in 
ministries of defense should primarily be run by senior 
officers and not by civil servants, since these have bet-
ter access to senior commanders. Our results, there-
fore, are an indication of the armed forces’ overall ob-
jectives in using social media and do not necessarily 
fully reflect practices in the field. 
These significant limitations mean that the findings 
presented and discussed here must not be overstated. 
More research is needed to provide a more thorough 
and solid picture of armed forces’ views of—and use 
of—social media in peacekeeping operations at differ-
ent levels of the organization. However, because this 
study includes responses from the armed forces of al-
most all EU states, it provides a useful starting point for 
future research. 
Firstly, we asked a few general questions; namely, 
what types of social media the armed forces use, and 
their view as to whether or not social media mainly 
posed risks or presented opportunities, when used in 
an area of deployment. We also asked if they had is-
sued a social media strategy. Indeed, armed forces, 
that have not adopted a social media strategy, may 
have other policies that regulate the use of communi-
cation by the agency and/or its personnel. A few indi-
cated that this is the case. The Netherlands for exam-
ple stated: ‘We provide guidelines for using Social 
Media. Info opsec is forbidden to share. We hand out 
tips & tricks for the use of social media.’ However, this 
is not the same as having an elaborate general official 
view on social media use, which is valid as strategic 
guidelines for the entire organization. 
In order to capture different types of opportuni-
ties/risks that we argue social media could offer/pose 
to armed forces, we formulated three risk and three 
opportunity statements. The statements of risk/threat 
read as follows: Personnel stationed in an area of de-
ployment (for example Afghanistan) using social media 
platforms (for example blogs): a) Make the Armed 
Forces lose control and risk distorting information, 
making it less correct; b) Place soldiers at risk by re-
vealing sensitive information; c) Harm mission purpose 
by revealing sensitive information. 
The statements of opportunity are: Personnel sta-
tioned in an area of deployment (for example Afghani-
stan) using social media platforms (for example blogs): 
a) Are a good way to market the armed forces and its 
mission in the area of deployment; b) Facilitate one-
way communication with the civilian population and is 
a good way to disseminate correct information about 
the armed forces; c) Facilitate two-way communication 
with the civilian population, increasing transparency of 
the operation. 
The respondents were asked to grade each state-
ment from “do not agree at all” (1) to “wholly agree” 
(5). When presenting the answers we merged the two 
answers indicating agreement, as well as the two an-
swers indicating disagreement, which resulted in three 
categories of answers (disagree/neither disagree or 
agree/agree). The distribution of responses was then 
set against the two explanatory factors: ICT maturity in 
a national setting and the existence of social media pol-
icies in cross-tables. The explanatory factors were 
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cross-tabulated against each risk and opportunity fac-
tor to explore relationships between them. In the 
presentation of the results we focus on those instances 
where a particular risk or opportunity was found to be 
related to an explanatory factor. 
The ICT maturity factor was derived from the statis-
tics of the International Telecommunication Union 
(2015) using the latest figures (from 2013) listing the 
share of population using the Internet. The armed forces 
were divided into three groups: firstly, armed forces 
from high ICT maturity countries with Internet use above 
85% of the population: the Netherlands, Sweden, Fin-
land, Denmark, Luxembourg and the UK. Secondly, 
armed forces from moderate ICT maturity countries with 
Internet use between 70 and 84% of the population: the 
Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Slovakia, Hungary and Spain. 
And finally, armed forces from low ICT maturity coun-
tries with Internet use below 69%: Lithuania, Italy, Croa-
tia, Malta, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Portugal. 
4. Views on Social Media Use: Risk versus Opportunity 
4.1. General Views on Social Media Use 
In this section we account for the general results of the 
survey that clarify views on the use of social media, as 
well as perceptions of risks and opportunities in rela-
tion to social media use. 
The findings from our survey show that all the armed 
forces, with the exception of Luxembourg, claim to use 
social media; first and foremost Facebook, YouTube and 
Twitter. Some also name Instagram, Google+ and 
LinkedIn, but only a few say that they use blogs. 
Only 11 of the armed forces claim to have an official 
social media strategy (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Spain, the 
Czech Republic and the UK). It is a recent phenomenon 
since, with the exception of Ireland (2008) and the UK 
(2009), these armed forces only issued a social media 
strategy in the last couple of years. Among those armed 
forces without a social media strategy, eight claim that 
they are planning to issue one (Bulgaria, Croatia, Den-
mark, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden). 
When asked about the opportunities and risks of 
social media use in areas of deployment, almost all of 
the European armed forces recognize that social media 
offer opportunities. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, half of the armed forces 
acknowledge that there are problems and risks in-
volved with social media use, but none perceives the 
risks as outweighing the opportunities when these are 
discussed in general terms. 
Next we examine perceptions of specific risks and 
opportunities. Figure 2 shows the armed forces’ per-
ception of specific risks mentioned in the survey. 
Figure 2 shows that, among the three potential 
risks, the one referring to “social media use placing 
soldiers at risk by revealing sensitive information” col-
lects the greatest number of agreements. Fewer per-
ceive a risk that the armed forces might lose control 
and information might become distorted. Social media 
has opened the field of communication to new actors, 
each with the potential and capability of giving differ-
ent accounts of an event, posting different images of 
an institution, or purposefully publishing false infor-
mation worldwide. Yet several armed forces, such as 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy, say that they see 
no such risks with social media use in an area of de-
ployment. Rather, the most commonly perceived risks 
are those related to the security of soldiers, and then, 
the risk of harming mission purpose. 
 
Figure 1. Views on social media as mainly a risk or as an opportunity. 
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Figure 2. Risks with using social media. 
 
Figure 3. Opportunities with using social media. 
In Figure 3 we examine how armed forces perceive 
the opportunities provided by social media use. 
Figure 3 shows that most armed forces see social 
media use as beneficial for marketing purposes and 
for two-way communication with the civilian popula-
tion. Fewer armed forces are convinced that social 
media facilitates one-way communication with the civil-
ian population and is a good way to disseminate correct 
information. This may indicate that few armed forces 
are convinced that social media can replace traditional 
media for informing and one-way communication with 
local populations in areas of deployments. 
We now move on to explore if the existence of a 
social media strategy and the national level of ICT ma-
turity influence armed forces’ perceptions of social 
media as a threat or an opportunity. 
4.2. How ICT Maturity Relates to Perceptions of 
Opportunity and Risk in Social Media Use in European 
Armed Forces 
We start by examining risks and opportunities on an 
aggregated level in relation to national ICT levels (see 
Table 1). 
As can be seen from the table, there are only minor 
differences between the three groups of armed forces, 
yet armed forces in countries with high ICT maturity 
perceive risks as less severe as compared to their coun-
terparts within countries with low ICT maturity. Next 
we analyzed perceptions of opportunities on an aggre-
gated level, as shown in Table 2. 
Again, we can see that there are no major differences 
between the groups when it comes to opportunities on 
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Table 1. Risks related to experiences of international deployments. 
 Extensive experience of  
troop deployment 
Moderate experience of  
troop deployment 
Minor experience of  
troop deployment 
 Total for all 
armed forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed forces  
Total for all 
armed forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed forces 
Total for all 
armed forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed forces 
Risk assessment 85 10,6 75 7,5 64 8,0 
Table 2. Opportunities related to experiences of international deployments. 
 Extensive experience of  
troop deployment 
Moderate experience of  
troop deployment 
Minor experience of  
troop deployment 
 Total for all 
armed forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed forces  
Total for all 
armed forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed forces   
Total for all 
armed forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed forces 
Opportunity 
assessment 
74 9,3 114 11,4 69 8,6 
Table 3. Experience of international deployment related to the proposition “Social media use in an area of deployment 
place soldiers at risk by revealing sensitive information”. 
 Disagree Neither disagree or agree Agree Row total 
Extensive experience of troop deployment 1 - 7 8 
Moderate experience of troop deployment 3 2 5 10 
Minor experience of troop deployment 3 2 3 8 
Column total 7 4 15 26 
 
an aggregated level. Yet, when looking at the three po-
tential opportunities separately (see Table 3), the anal-
ysis shows that all but one of the armed forces in coun-
tries with high ICT maturity emphasize social media use 
as a good way to market the armed forces and its mis-
sion—and none of the armed forces in this group disa-
grees. Most armed forces in countries with moderate 
ICT maturity also view marketing as an opportunity, 
although a few disagree. 
Based on the Table 3, we conclude that armed forces 
from countries with moderate and high ICT maturity are 
more optimistic when it comes to using social media for 
marketing purposes. Thus, it seems that moderate or 
high ICT maturity is required in armed forces’ home 
countries for them to view social media as suitable for 
projecting a favorable image of missions and troops. 
In the next section we examine how social media 
strategies impact on the perception of social media as 
a threat or opportunity.   
4.3. How the Existence of an Official Social Media 
Strategy Relates to Perceptions of Social Media Use in 
European Armed Forces 
Here we analyze how a social media strategy relates to 
perceptions of risks and opportunities. It was found 
that armed forces from countries with the lowest level 
of ICT maturity (such as Croatia and Bulgaria) also lack 
a social media strategy. Yet, of those armed forces 
from countries with high ICT maturity, only the UK and 
Denmark have issued an official social media strategy. 
Again, we start by showing the aggregated results 
based on all three risk factors. 
As can be seen from Table 4, we discerned no clear 
results at the aggregated level when it comes to risk 
perceptions. Moving onto the independent analysis of 
each of the three risks, we also did not notice any clear 
patterns, yet some small differences among armed 
forces are worth considering (see Table 5). 
As the table shows, all but two of the armed forces 
with a social media strategy acknowledge that soldiers 
might be placed at risk through social media use. In the 
group of armed forces lacking a social media strategy 
views on this risk-factor are more evenly distributed 
with some (Sweden, Slovenia, Latvia and the Nether-
lands) not considering this a risk, while others (Denmark, 
Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Portugal and Slo-
vakia) acknowledge this to be a risk. In Table 6 we move 
on to analyzing the opportunities at the aggregated level. 
As seen from the table, there are no clear results 
when examining opportunities at the aggregated level. 
As can be seen from Table 7, among the opportuni-
ties, the most interesting one is marketing. For armed 
forces lacking a social media strategy, on third agrees 
that social media are a good way to market armed 
forces and their mission in an area of deployment, 
whereas only one out of five armed forces with a social 
media strategy agrees to this. It seems that armed 
forces that have not adopted a social media strategy 
are somewhat more prone to conceive of marketing 
opportunities. These are however small differences 
that should not be exaggerated. 
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Table 4. Risks related to ICT maturity. 
 High ICT maturity Moderate ICT maturity Low ICT maturity 
 Total for all 
armed 
forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed 
forces 
Total for all 
armed 
forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed 
forces 
Total for all 
armed 
forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed 
forces 
Risk assessment 44 7,3 108 9,0 84 10,5 
Table 5. Opportunities related to ICT maturity. 
 High ICT maturity Moderate ICT maturity Low ICT maturity 
 Total for all 
armed 
forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed 
forces 
Total for all 
armed 
forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed 
forces 
Total for all 
armed 
forces 
Average per 
individual 
armed 
forces 
Opportunity 
assessment 
65 9,2 126 10,5 69 8,6 
Table 6. Social media use as a good way to market the armed forces and its mission in the area of deployment related 
to ICT maturity. 
 Disagree Neither disagree or agree Agree Row total 
High ICT maturity - 1 5 6 
Moderate ICT maturity  2 3 7 12 
Low ICT maturity 2 3 3 8 
Column total 4 7 15 26 
Table 7. Risks related to the existence of a social media strategy. 
 Having issued a social media strategy Not having issued a social media strategy 
 Total for all  
armed forces 
Average per individual 
armed forces 
Total for all  
armed forces 
Average per individual 
armed forces 
Risk assessment 109 10,0 118 7,9 
 
5. Conclusions 
The results of the analysis of EU armed forces’ percep-
tions of risks and opportunities from social media use 
in areas of deployment show that armed forces em-
brace social media as an opportunity more than they 
emphasize the risks. The most commonly perceived 
opportunities are marketing and two-way communica-
tion. Fewer appreciate the opportunity of using social 
media for one-way communication. The focus on mar-
keting and PR corresponds with the point made in the 
introduction (e.g. Byrkjeflot & Angell, 2007) about a 
general tendency within public organizations to in-
creasingly focus on marketing. Armed forces appear to 
follow this trend. 
While none of the armed forces view social media 
primarily as a problem or risk, half of the armed forces 
acknowledge that the use of social media does involve 
risks. When asked to assess specific risks, the probabil-
ity that social media use places soldiers at risk, by re-
vealing sensitive information, is most common. Some-
what surprisingly, the risk of social media use distorting 
information, making it less correct, is acknowledged by 
fewer armed forces. As argued in the section on previ-
ous research, academics have dealt with armed forces’ 
preoccupation with control of the strategic narrative 
(e.g. Bjerg Jensen, 2011), yet our results indicate that 
the risk of distorting information is not seen as the ma-
jor problem with social media use in areas of deploy-
ment. This indicates that armed forces more often fo-
cus on the dangers of social media in relation to the 
safety of military personnel (e.g. Maltby et al., 2015, p. 
17), rather than on the risk that they interfere with or 
distort their strategic narrative. 
Furthermore, we explored whether or not views on 
opportunities and risks were related to the existence of 
a social media strategy and ICT maturity. In terms of 
ICT maturity, we found that all armed forces but one, 
from countries where ICT maturity is moderate or high, 
consider marketing an opportunity provided by social 
media use. Among armed forces from countries with the 
lowest ICT maturity views are divided. This contradicts 
previous research stating that the use of social media by 
governmental agencies does not correspond to the na-
tional level of ICT maturity (Bonsón et al., 2012). At least, 
it seems that ICT maturity does matter when it comes to 
armed forces’ views on social media use. Also, we found 
that armed forces that have not adopted a social media 
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strategy are somewhat more positive towards using so-
cial media for marketing purposes. 
Finally, as recognized above, we only investigated 
armed forces’ viewpoints at the strategic level and, as 
argued above, more research is needed to provide a 
more complete picture of armed forces’ views of social 
media in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, recog-
nizing that ICT maturity and a social media strategy 
have relatively little impact, we must investigate other 
factors that might explain national differences in per-
ceptions of the risks and opportunities of social media 
use. Should we search for explanations in the national 
strategic cultures of armed forces? What role do previ-
ous negative experiences of placing personnel at risk 
play in deciding what measures are taken to regulate 
the use of social media? In contrast, how do positive 
experiences of social media as a marketing tool spur 
development towards less regulation and more posi-
tive views on social media? Further research with more 
refined questionnaires and/or interviews is needed to 
deepen our understanding of the attitudes of armed 
forces towards the use of social media. 
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Appendix  
Please note that a few more questions were included in the questionnaire, but since they did not form part of the anal-
ysis of this article they are not listed below. 
Questionnaire on the Armed Forces’ social media strategy 
Introduction 
The questionnaire forms part of the research project “Social media strategies of Armed Forces” conducted by five post-
graduate scholars of war studies and political science at the Swedish National Defense University. The aim is to analyze 
how Armed Forces from states forming part of NATO and/or the EU looks upon the use of social media in connection 
with military missions abroad as well as everyday work at home. Since there is limited data on how the armed forces 
make use of social media we would like to generate deeper knowledge in this field. 
In order to gather this data we would very much appreciate the cooperation of a person responsible for the social me-
dia strategy of Armed Forces (Head of Information Department or its equivalent) to answer the survey. The answers are 
anonymous. 
What is your current position? 
Representative of Information Department of the Armed Forces 
Representative of Ministry of Defense 
Other position, yet with tasks related to the Armed Forces’ information and communication 
Use of social media by the Armed Forces 
Do the Armed Forces officially make use of the following social media: 
 Yes No Do not know 
Facebook 
You Tube 
Twitter 
Blogging 
Instagram 
Other (please specify) 
How active are the Armed Forces on social media? 
Make use of social media daily  
Make use of social media weekly  
Make use of social media monthly  
Do not know 
How would you characterize social media from the perspective of the Armed Forces: 
Mainly an opportunity 
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Mainly a problem or a risk 
Both an opportunity and a problem/risk  
Has the Armed Forces officially issued a social media strategy? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, please name the year of issue.  
If the Armed Forces are about to issue such a strategy, please name the year of its planned release 
To what degree do you agree with the following statements about use of social media in an area of deployment (for ex-
ample Afghanistan) 
Not agree—Wholly agree on a 1-5 scale.  3=Neither agree nor disagree   
Personnel stationed in an area of deployment (for example Afghanistan) using social media platforms (for example 
blogs):  
Makes the Armed Forces lose control and risk distorting information, making it less correct  
Place soldiers at risk by revealing sensitive information  
Harm mission purpose by revealing sensitive information   
Is a good way to market the Armed Forces and its mission in the area of deployment  
Facilitates one-way communication with the civilian population and is a good way to disseminate correct information 
about the Armed Forces      
Facilitate two-way communication with the civilian population, increasing the transparency of the operation    
Among the following options, what is the greatest advantage with using social media by the Armed Forces and its per-
sonnel stationed in an area of deployment? Please rank from 1 to 3. 
Use of social media of the Armed Forces and its personnel in an era of deployment…   
Is a good way to market the Armed Forces and its mission in the area of deployment  
Facilitates one-way communication with the civilian population and is a good way to disseminate correct information 
about the Armed Forces      
Facilitate two-way communication with the civilian population, increasing the transparency of the operation     
Please mention other negative aspects of social media (if you see any other risks with the Armed forces or its military 
personnel using social media platforms)  
Please mention other positive aspects of social media (if you see any advantages with the Armed Forces or its military 
personnel using social media platforms) 
